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Abstract
The Causal Model of introspection has its more than fair share of critics and 
indeed in recent years the model has fallen out of favor in the philosophical 
world. In this paper, I defend the model and argue that it is an excellent 
candidate, given a realist commitment about the mental, to explain our peculiar, 
but contingent, introspective access to beliefs. 
Keywords: causal model, introspection, belief, peculiarity of self-ascriptions, 
contingency of self-ascriptions.
Resumo
O modelo causal de introspecção tem recebido muitas críticas e, de fato, nos 
últimos anos, tem caído em desuso no mundo filosófico. Neste artigo defendo 
o modelo e sustento que ele é um excelente candidato, dado um compromisso 
realista para com o mental, para explicar o nosso acesso introspectivo peculiar, 
mas contingente, às crenças. 
Palavras-chave: modelo causal, introspecção, crença, peculiaridade de 
autoatribuições, contingência de autoatribuições.
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The peculiarity and contingency of the introspection of belief
The paper proceeds as follows. After some preliminaries (§§ 1-2), I introduce 
the phenomenon to be explained: the peculiarity of the introspection of belief (§§ 
3-4). Next I introduce the Causal Model and show how it captures such peculiarity 
(§§ 5-6). After defending the model against objections regarding the contingency 
to which it is committed (§§ 7-8), I offer some concluding remarks (§ 9). 
Realism about the Mental 
It can prove difficult to know where to start in philosophy but, as Stroud 
(2000, p. 3) says, “a major part of philosophy as I understand it is the attempt to 
find out where that is.” I take realism about the mental to be the starting point for 
the present investigation and this paper can be partly seen as an attempt to show 
that this is a fruitful starting point. No doubt this starting point puts me at odds 
with some competing approaches (as we shall see), but I take this anyway to be an 
independently plausible starting point. It is nevertheless conceivable that realism 
about the mental is false, although its epistemic security seems greater than that 
of its competitors. Anyway it is my starting point, so debate about its truth isn’t 
really an issue here. 
So let me explain what I understand by realism and what I take its conse-
quences for an account of introspection to be. Realism is a metaphysical doctrine 
about what exists. I take it that the two basic (and related) tenets of a realist thesis 
about any area of discourse are: the claim that the objects of such discourse exist 
objectively and the claim that they exist independently from the mental.3 This mind-
independence might seem to rule out the very possibility of realism about the mental, 
since the existence of the mental is, in a trivial way, mind-dependent. However, the 
mind-independence condition is meant to be understood as the claim, concerning 
the mental, that the world which contains mental states does not depend on the 
creatures’ capacity to determine that such world does contain such states. 
So let us examine further the two general claims. Realism about the mental 
does not maintain that mental states are in no way subjective, but that they are also 
in some sense objective. Such objectivity is secured by the existence of an indepen-
dent third-person perspective, the perspective from which we ascribe mental states 
to others, on the basis of observable behaviour (Smith, 1998). So it is this public 
character of the mental (i.e., mental items can in principle be observed by persons 
other than their possessors) which guarantees its objectivity and opens a potential 
gap between reality and appearance. That is, a potential mismatch between, say, 
one’s beliefs about one’s mental states and others’ beliefs about those states. 
This commonplace appearance/reality gap introduces the possibilities of er-
ror and ignorance. On the one hand, ignorance is possible because one could lack 
contact with reality. And on the other, error is possible because one could make 
imperfect contact with reality. So in order to avoid error and ignorance with regard 
to substantive propositions of the discourse, one has to make adequate contact 
with  reality. Indeed, the mind is there to be discovered rather than invented by 
our inquiry into it (cf. Tanney, 2002). And since discovery is a matter of contingent 
success, there is no guarantee that one will discover such reality. 
Moving onto the second tenet, the mental can exist independently of one’s 
thoughts, judgements, beliefs, etc., about it. And one might be in a mental state 
without having any thoughts, judgements, beliefs, etc., about it or while having the 
3 There are different notions of realism (e.g., Dummett, 1978), so I do not expect this characterisation to be 
universally accepted. 
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wrong ones. But the extent to which we know about such reality is an epistemic 
issue that I won’t address here. The paper is concerned with how self-ascription 
(of belief) is arrived at, not whether we have self-knowledge or not.4 However, I do 
take the possibility of self-error and self-ignorance seriously. It is important that our 
account of self-ascription accommodates them: we need to allow for both success 
and failure in self-ascription. 
So, given realism about the mental, mental states and their self-ascriptions 
are ontologically independent: one’s mental states exist independently of their self-
ascriptions. In other words, mental states do not depend for their existence on one’s 
capacity to self-ascribe them; hence the need to discover them even in our own 
case. This contingent discovery points to a non-deflationary view of introspection.5 
That is, introspective awareness is a genuine cognitive achievement: self-ascriptions 
track their ontologically distinct self-ascribed states (Fricker, 1998).6 So I take it that 
an account of introspection also needs to allow for introspection to be taken as a 
genuine cognitive achievement. 
It is clear then that, given a commitment to realism about the mental, an 
account of introspection that accommodates these constraints is preferable. But as 
one might expect, the above constraints aren’t universally accepted. So, for example, 
Cartesian approaches that deny self-ignorance and self-error (e.g., Descartes, 1984) 
and constitutivist approaches that deny the ontological independence of the self-
ascription and the self-ascribed state (e.g., Shoemaker, 1994d) are in tension with 
this commitment.7 
The Nature of Belief
Although I have so far been talking of the mental generally, my main concern 
in this paper is with belief. So here I briefly introduce the mental phenomenon of 
belief.8 To that purpose, and following Richard Wollheim (1999), I sketch a broad 
(though not exhaustive) map of the mental (more specifically, of the phenomena that 
our folk-psychological concepts pick out). The mental can be divided into two major 
categories: the occurrent, experiential phenomena (such as perceptions, sensations 
and entertained thoughts) and the dispositional, non-experiential phenomena (such 
as beliefs, desires and intentions). The fundamental difference between these two 
4 Although I am not concerned with scepticism about self-knowledge in this paper, notice that realism about 
the mental does rule out one particular kind of scepticism about our minds: namely, the scepticism promoted 
by eliminativism. Briefly, eliminativism is the thesis that denies that our mental discourse picks out any real 
psychological categories (and so urges that such discourse be eliminated, hence its name; see Churchland, 1981). 
5 In deflationary approaches (cf. Wright, 1998), self-ascriptions are not made by tracking some independent 
reality. That is, there is no genuine cognitive achievement (Gertler, 2008).
6 Fernandez (2013, p. 28) takes cognitive achievement to be “the result of some cognitive operation I perform.” 
This is something done at the personal level and which takes an effort on my part: it is not something that 
happens to me (2013, p. 28). I take this to be an implausibly strong understanding of cognitive achievement 
if self-ascriptions are meant to represent cognitive achievements given that most self-ascriptions do not satisfy 
such characterisation (consider the case of self-ascriptions regarding stored beliefs). This notion of cognitive 
achievement also has undesirable consequences outside self-ascription (consider the case of perceptual beliefs). 
And these worries become more significant if one holds, as many do, that knowledge involves a cognitive 
achievement (e.g., Greco, 2010; Sosa, 2007). 
7 Another approach that (at least a brand of) realism about the mental is in tension with is the expressivist one. 
Roughly, the expressivist claims that self-ascriptions are natural self-expressions (such as “Ouch!”, where I’m 
simply expressing a painful state) that lack propositional content and so denies that self-ascriptions (beliefs/
judgements about beliefs) are truth-evaluable (e.g., Wittgenstein, 1953; cf. Bar-On, 2004). A realist (like 
Dummett), on the other hand, holds that the discourse in question is apt for truth or falsity, which is determined 
by some set of facts. The self-ascriptions function in a genuinely descriptive way: they (are intended to) pick 
out the things there are. So the expressivist approach isn’t even an option, given this realism about the mental. 
8 Anti-realist conceptions of belief, such as the instrumentalist one (e.g., Dennett, 1987), are ignored. 
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categories is that while the former set of phenomena is properly characterised as 
mental acts (or events) that possess phenomenology, the latter is not. 
Beliefs are dispositional states that lack phenomenology. First, beliefs are 
enduring, as opposed to passing, phenomena. Beliefs are not things that happen 
to one; they are not occurrences. Second, beliefs are not consciously experienced. 
There is no such thing as an ‘occurrent belief’ or a ‘conscious belief’. As Crane says: 
[We] need to distinguish between being conscious of what you believe, and consciously 
believing. […It] makes little sense to say ‘I have been believing p all morning’; or ‘I 
believed p for a few hours last night and then I was distracted by the television’. […
So,] although there is such thing as being conscious of one’s belief, that does not 
mean that there is such a thing as consciously believing (2001, p. 105-108). 
Beliefs, unlike the occurrent, experiential states in which they manifest them-
selves (say, a judgement or an episode of affirmation), do not possess phenom-
enology. So accounts of introspection that detect mental states by means of their 
phenomenological properties, such as Alvin Goldman’s phenomenological view 
(1993), cannot be applied to belief.9
Moreover, beliefs are propositional attitudes. Propositional attitudes are men-
tal phenomena (of either category) which are formulated as ‘S As that p’, where ‘S’ 
refers to the subject, ‘A’ expresses the general type of attitude (say, believes, judges, 
hopes), and ‘p’ expresses a proposition.10 One can then distinguish between mental 
content, given by p, and relation, given by A, and so speak of propositional attitudes 
as having a relational nature, since they are relations to contents. 
The mental relation is the characteristic type of role (or function) that dif-
ferentiates each attitude. These relations can be divided into two kinds given their 
direction of fit. The belief relation has a mind-to-world direction of fit (the mind is 
to fit the world), as opposed to a world-to-mind direction of fit (the world is to fit 
the mind—consider, e.g., desires). Beliefs are the kind of disposition whose role is 
to provide one with a picture of reality. Indeed, we value our beliefs because we 
take them to be true. So the belief relation involves a commitment to the truth of 
the proposition believed. Beliefs are not just truth-apt (given their propositional 
content), they aim at truth. 
The Introspection of Beliefs 
The self-ascription of beliefs can be achieved in two different ways. It can be 
achieved through self-interpretation and through introspection. By ‘self-interpre-
tation’ I mean the process of reasoning based on evidence by which we sometimes 
self-ascribe all sorts of mental states. So I understand self-interpretation as a Rylean-
like type of self-ascription (Ryle, 1949). I say Rylean-like because the evidence on 
which the inferences are based needn’t be only behavioural. Our self-interpretative 
ascriptions can also follow from premises about our personality traits and other 
mental states. 
9 Indeed, here I am only concerned with accounts of introspection that are aimed at dispositional states or 
accounts that can be extended to them. See also Klausen (2008, p. 446-447), who argues for the thesis that 
propositional attitudes are essentially phenomenal, but restricts it so as to leave beliefs out (cf. Churchland, 
1992, p. 32). 
10 There are many views about the nature of propositions but, to a considerable extent, the debate about 
the nature of propositions runs separately from the debate about the nature of belief and so in this paper I 
remain silent on the issue. 
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Now, Paul Boghossian puts forward an argument against models of self-
knowledge that base all self-ascriptions on inferences from premises about behav-
iour. His Anti-Rylean argument (Boghossian, 2003 [1989], p. 67) goes as follows: 
You think: Even lousy composers sometimes write great arias. And you know immedi-
ately on thinking it, that that is what you thought. What explanation can the Rylean 
offer of this? The difficulty is not merely that, contrary to appearance and the canons 
of epistemic practice, he has to construe the knowledge as inferential. The difficulty is 
that he has to construe it as involving inference from premises about behaviour that 
you could not possibly possess. 
Many have echoed this criticism of the Rylean approach. Usually writers 
point out that, even when one is perfectly still and silent, one can still know 
one’s own mental states. That is, although there is no behaviour to determine 
what the mental state is, we still know it. But, as seen, there is no reason for 
the sympathiser of the Rylean approach not to extend the evidential resources 
available for the ascriptions. Indeed, any serious account will likely do so. So, 
although Boghossian’s argument doesn’t rule out the possibility of there being 
only (inferential and evidential) self-interpretative access to our mental states, 
it does shift the onus onto those who favour such views. They need to find a 
source of evidence that can account for all self-ascription and that has proven 
rather difficult to do.11 
So I take it that self-ascription can also be achieved through some other 
means: introspection.12 I employ the term ‘introspection’ in a broad way so as to 
pick out whichever mental process is involved in the non-self-interpretative self-
ascription of mental states. I am in this paper primarily concerned with this form of 
self-ascription because it is claimed to be special, in the sense of being epistemically 
distinctive. The claim that our introspective self-ascriptions are special is normally 
understood in terms of privileged access. But there are many different senses of the 
term (e.g., Alston, 1971; Gallois, 1996; Gertler, 2003). I differentiate here between 
two main epistemic claims: on the one hand, the security of self-ascriptions and, 
on the other, the peculiarity of self-ascriptions (see also Wright, 1998; Fernandez, 
2003; Gertler, 2010; Smithies and Stoljar, 2012). Roughly, the latter maintains that 
self-ascriptions can be known differently from the way we know the ascriptions 
to others; the former states that self-ascriptions can be known better than the as-
criptions to others.13 Here I focus on the peculiarity thesis. So let us consider how 
self-ascription might be peculiar. 
11 For example, Gopnik (1993) suggests that evidence to be psychological experiences, but we can easily 
conceive of cases where no such experience is involved in the self-ascription (indeed, Boghossian thinks that 
a similar argument can be given for any source of evidence suggested). So Gopnik’s additional source of 
evidence doesn’t do the job and the prospects of there being one are gloomy. In fact, if you, like me, think 
that some self-ascriptions are groundlessly warranted—there are cases where it would be unreasonable to 
ask someone “How do you know that you believe that?” (see, e.g., Neta, 2011, p. 18-19), then Boghossian 
might just be right (cf. Cassam, 2014). 
12 Although self-interpretation does not seem able to accommodate all self-ascription, we cannot give it up 
on pain of having no chance to capture confabulation phenomena (see, e.g., Carruthers, 2011). Furthermore, 
phenomenologically speaking, it seems pretty clear that sometimes we ascribe mental states that way (see, 
e.g., Cassam, 2014). 
13 Peculiarity and security are two independent claims. So, for example, Ryle (1949) denies the peculiarity claim 
(our access to our own minds is the same in kind as our access to other minds) while accepting the security 
claim (we have more access to the relevant evidence in our case than in the case of others); so he rejects only 
one of the two claims associated with privileged access. The reverse case is also possible: we might have access 
to our own mind in a peculiar way (say, through ‘inner perception’) but fail to be secure by comparison to our 
access to other minds (say, both processes are equally susceptible to error). 
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The Peculiarity of Introspection 
The peculiarity thesis maintains that self-ascriptions are arrived at differently, in 
an epistemically relevant way, from other-ascriptions. In order to determine how this 
may be so, we could start by characterising the way we arrive at other-ascriptions. 
Third-person ascription is traditionally regarded as inferential and evidential 
(e.g., Ryle, 1949; Boghossian, 2003 [1989]). Moreover, the two most widely held 
views of the processes involved in third-person ascription, the Theory-Theory and 
the Simulation-Theory, involve processes which, although different, are both infer-
ential and evidential (e.g., Davies and Stone, 1995a, 1995b; Carruthers and Smith, 
1996). So, for example, the Theory-Theory maintains that we ascribe mental states 
to others by means of Theory of Mind-mediated inferences. The Theory of Mind 
is a rich body of data (either innate or acquired)14 that provides (at least) one of 
the premises required for the (tacit) inference. The inference involves two distinct 
types of premises: one type is the Theory of Mind-generalisation (for examples, see 
Churchland, 1981) and the other type is a premise about the particulars concerning 
the target. So, according to the Theory-Theory, the ascription of beliefs to others is 
reached through an inference from a generalisation and some particular evidence. 
So, given third-person ascription is inferential and evidential, introspective self-
ascription, negatively characterised, is to be a non-inferential, non-evidential process 
if the peculiarity thesis is to hold. Given this, we can appreciate that self-interpretative 
ascriptions of one’s mental states do not count as special in the peculiarity sense. 
Since the ascription of mental states to others is inferential and evidential, the self-
interpretative process does not differ from the third-person one. They are both 
inferential processes (although for all that has been said so far, distinct inferential 
processes might be involved) that employ behavioural and other kinds of evidence. 
This rules out an asymmetry between these two types of ascriptions of mental states. 
So, although we can self-ascribe through self-interpretation, those ascriptions 
cannot be achieved differently. By contrast, introspective self-ascriptions seem intui-
tively to be arrived at differently.15 A prima facie reason for accepting this peculiarity 
thesis comes from the problem of other minds, which seems to stem from a funda-
mental asymmetry between our relation to our own and other minds. So assuming 
we would prefer to capture such peculiarity, next I introduce an introspective model 
that both is in line with our realist commitment and captures that peculiarity. 
The Causal Model
The Causal Model of introspection maintains both that first-level states are 
conceptually and ontologically independent of the second-level states and that the 
former cause the latter. These are the two fundamental features of the model (cf. 
Shoemaker, 1994b). However, notice that the latter feature requires the former, 
given that in order for one state to cause the other, they need to be, as Hume says, 
“distinct existences” (ontologically distinct states).16 First of all, notice that these two 
14 Some claim the theory develops via a general theory-forming capacity (Gopnik and Wellman, 1992). This process 
is meant to be analogous to the development of scientific theory. Others claim that the theory is innate (Carruthers, 
1996). But these aren’t the only options available. For example, one could, following Sterelny (2003), deny both of 
the above claims by holding that the generalisations are learned not through theorising, but through instruction, 
more particularly, by means of the epistemically engineered environment, which he calls “scaffolded learning.” 
15 Against the possibility of an illusion of peculiarity, as suggested by Gopnik (1993), see § 3. 
16 So arguing against the ontological independence of the states (§ 8) will also count as an attack on the causal 
claim, since if the states were not distinct existences, they could not be related as cause and effect. 
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features of the model already allow us to accommodate realism about the mental 
(indeed, nothing is more real than what causes effects) and one of its main conse-
quences: the fact that successful self-ascriptions involve a cognitive achievement 
(since they track their ontologically distinct self-ascribed states). Moreover, as one 
would expect, given that the connection between the first- and the second-level 
states is a contingent one, the model can easily make sense of self-ignorance and 
self-error (since the states are distinct existences, one could exist without the other). 
So the Causal Model of introspection of beliefs claims that beliefs normally 
cause their self-ascriptions. But how do beliefs cause them? To this question dif-
ferent answers can be offered, given that there are different types of tracking. For 
example, the Inner Sense view holds that the introspective process is akin to percep-
tion (Locke, 1975, p. II.1.xix; Armstrong, 1993, p. 94). The “inner eye” detects by 
some sort of perception the belief to be self-ascribed. But this view seems wrong. 
There is no introspective sense-organ and introspection does not have a distinctive 
phenomenology, to mention two of the problems facing this view.17 Fortunately, 
the Causal Model can be divorced from the idea of inner perception. The tracking 
can exist without inner perception. The self-ascriptions can be caused by a non-
perceptual mechanism, such as the one hypothesised by Nichols and Stich (2003): 
the Monitoring Mechanism (hereafter ‘MM’). In order to render the model more 
substantial, I will take MM to be the non-perceptual, introspective mechanism.18 
Let me introduce MM by quoting from Nichols and Stich (2003, p. 160-161): 
To have beliefs about one’s own beliefs, all that is required is that there be a [MM] that, 
when activated, takes the representation that p in the Belief Box as input and produces 
the representation I believe that p as output. This mechanism would be trivial to imple-
ment. To produce representations of one’s own beliefs, the [MM] merely has to copy 
representations from the Belief Box, embed the copies in a representation schema of the 
form: I believe that___, and then place the new representations back in the Belief Box. 
So MM takes beliefs as inputs and produces self-ascriptions as outputs, by 
embedding the copies of the beliefs in the schema I believe that___. MM might 
seem simple, but that is no reason to think that it’s “trivial to implement,” since 
the beliefs that are being copied possess complex properties that give them the 
content and role they have in our mental economy. Although copying processes 
are common in organisms (for example, dividing cells copy their DNA each time 
they divide), whether this particular copying process will turn out to be trivial is 
not something we are currently in a position to assess. This, however, is no reason 
to reject the MM hypothesis. 
So MM is taken as the introspective mechanism. However, the introspective 
process needs to be activated, as Nichols and Stich acknowledge. The input rep-
resentation might just do that job, but then what is missing is a proposal for the 
input-feeding process. A fuller story will tell us just how such input is made avail-
able to MM.19 But this feeding process is meant to provide the input that activates 
17 For other criticisms see, e.g., Shoemaker (1994a) and Cassam (2014). Of course, proponents of the view 
are aware of the difficulties generated by the analogy with perception and so try to play it down (e.g., Lycan, 
1996, 2003), so much so that they are  ‘Inner Sense’ theorists just in name. 
18 However, notice the Causal Model does not require the adoption of the MM hypothesis. So the rejection of 
such hypothesis does not entail the rejection of the model. 
19 Unfortunately I do not have a proposal for such process, but it will be a subpersonal process and probably 
the same process that allows us to feed beliefs to other systems. Consider the case where, after being asked 
to say something, you spontaneously say “I’m a human being,” and that it manifests a belief you hold. The 
idea is that whatever process allows you to feed such belief into the speech system might also be responsible 
for the feeding process of MM.  
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MM, which is responsible for the causal psychological transition from the belief to 
the self-ascription of the belief. 
MM causally and contingently relates the belief and its self-ascription. Indeed, 
since the belief and its self-ascription are not conceptually and ontologically de-
pendent and there is a connection between them, a naturalistic approach suggests 
that such connection is causal.20 These features accommodate realism about the 
mental, make introspection a cognitive achievement and allow for the possibility 
of self-error and self-ignorance. All this makes a good prima facie case for the ac-
count and this support makes it compelling enough to be worth pursuing. But it 
only establishes that such an account is preferable to its competitors, all else being 
equal. But if this account had counterintuitive consequences, such as not capturing 
peculiarity, such support would probably not count for much. So, can the account 
accommodate the peculiarity of our introspective self-ascriptions? 
I argue next that the account can capture the peculiarity thesis.21 Subsequently I 
defend the model against criticisms concerning the contingency to which it is committed. 
The Causal Model and Peculiarity 
The peculiarity thesis maintains that self-ascriptions are arrived at differently 
from other-ascriptions. The processes for arriving at first- and third-person mental 
ascriptions are to differ in kind.22 So, given that third-person ascriptions are based 
on inferences (either tacit or explicit) from evidence, the introspective process is, as 
mentioned, taken to be, negatively characterised, non-inferential and non-evidential. 
So the question we now need to answer is whether the Causal Model makes the 
process a non-inferential, non-evidential one. 
But before considering that question, we need to make a clarification. The 
‘non-inferential, non-evidential process’ constraint could be understood in two 
ways. One understanding of the constraint is that introspection cannot be a process 
that is both inferential and evidential. Another understanding is that introspection 
cannot be either an inferential or an evidential process. This is because it is at least 
possible to have an evidential process that is not inferential (e.g., Peacocke, 1999).23 
I examine here the Causal Model against the second reading of the constraint, given 
that this reading entails the first one. If the process does not end up being either 
inferential or evidential, the model captures (both readings of) the peculiarity claim. 
So let’s start by considering whether MM involves an evidential process. Is there, 
according to the Causal Model, any evidence which is gathered and on which the self-
ascription is based? No. The self-ascription is based on the appropriate belief, but such 
relation is not evidential but brutely causal. Indeed, Peacocke (1999, p. 223ff) refers 
to models such as this as ‘no-reasons’ accounts and points out that the naturally ac-
companying epistemology of such accounts is reliabilism. This is because, given that 
20 This model is also friendly to epistemological naturalism, and particularly to reliabilism; see § 6.  
21 This model is of course compatible with the security thesis. The introspective process could be more reliable 
than the one responsible for other-ascriptions. 
22 However, it is important to keep in mind that the peculiarity thesis concerns only the introspective ascription 
of present mental states and the ascription of present mental states to others (i.e., the detection of mental 
states; see, e.g., Nichols and Stich, 2003, p. 151; Goldman, 2006, p. 223). So we are not concerned about 
the prediction of past and future mental states. It is anyway very likely that prediction in the first- and third-
person cases is not different in kind. 
23 Peacocke argues that one’s account needn’t be inferential if one has reasons for the self-ascriptions (1999, 
p. 214-215). Sensations, such as pain, can be reasons for one’s self-ascription, but they cannot be part of an 
inference (i.e., they cannot act as premises). This points to the possibility of a process being evidential but not 
inferential. Whether the self-ascription of beliefs is actually like that is a different matter. 
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the connection between the belief and the self-ascription is merely causal, what mat-
ters in the introspective process is that the causal connection is reliable. MM is fed a 
belief that is then copied and embedded in the appropriate schema. There is nothing 
involved in this process that deserves to be called ‘evidential’. The process consists 
merely of contingent causal connections between beliefs and their self-ascriptions. 
And does MM involve an inferential process? No. As characterised, MM involves 
a brutely causal process: a representation is copied and embedded in the appropriate 
schema. But the Causal Model seems compatible with the process being inferential. 
MM could resemble the Theory of Mind (if there is such a thing). But instead of 
comprising a network of generalisations, the body of data would consist of just one 
such generalisation: pBp. So for every belief that p being fed to MM, one (tacitly) 
infers its self-ascription. Perhaps the right way to characterise such a process is as an 
inferentially thin process, as opposed to an inferentially thick one, but it might still 
be regarded as an inferential process, which would mean that this version cannot 
capture the peculiarity of self-ascription understood as a difference in kind. 
But if ‘inference’ is not just any transition in thought (or processing of infor-
mation, such as the causal one that the original MM version is meant to instantiate), 
how can this inference (deductive or inductive) be warranted? This is because, firstly, 
if pBp is thought of as a deductive inference, given that the truth of p does not 
entail the truth of Bp, the inference is invalid, hence devoid of warranting power. 
Secondly, if pBp is thought of as an inductive inference, given that such inference 
is false for most implications, this inference is also devoid of warranting power. 
So it looks as if this inference cannot yield any warrant.24 
Even if the move from p to Bp could be warranted, this view would still face 
difficulties. After all, if we had the generalisation pBp, we would expect it to be 
just like other Theory of Mind-generalisations are meant to be. But, although we 
think that the third-person generalisations are true (all things considered), we don’t 
think that pBp is. We do not think that if something is the case, then we believe it 
(in fact our implicit commitment to realism explains this). Indeed, we do not believe 
everything that is the case. Moreover, if the generalisations are acquired, through 
either theorising or, more plausibly, scaffolded learning (fn.12), then it is hard to 
imagine how we would actually acquire such a generalization, which seems so 
counterintuitive to us. So we can safely disregard such a characterisation of MM.
MM then is best understood as merely involving a causal process, as opposed 
to an inferential and evidential process. So the introspection of beliefs, according 
to the Causal Model, is a non-inferential, non-evidential process and is a different 
kind of process than the one employed in other-ascription of beliefs.25 But some 
believe that the Causal Model cannot be faithful to the alleged intuition behind 
the peculiarity claim. 
24 The Displaced Perception model (“knowledge of internal (mental) facts via an awareness of external (physical) 
objects”; Dretske, 1995, p. 40—for more, see Byrne, 2005) tries to avoid these problems by requiring a 
connecting premise, but the move is ultimately unsuccessful (see Aydede, 2003). 
25 Now, if they are distinct processes, one would expect them to be subserved by numerically distinct 
mechanisms. So for the Causal Model to have empirical credibility, it is important that the evidence supports 
this (or, at least, does not stand against it). Unfortunately, the empirical evidence is inconclusive. It does not 
establish a double dissociation (for example, intact introspection and damaged other-ascription capacities in 
the case of autism, and damaged introspection and intact other-ascription capacities in the case of passivity 
forms of schizophrenia), but it is anyway compatible with it (see, e.g., Corcoran, 2000; Frith and Corcoran, 
1996; Gerland, 1997; Grandin, 1984; Hobson, 2011; Hurlburt, 1990; Hurlburt et al., 1994; Miedzianik, 1986; 
Parnas and Sass, 2011). So, importantly, the empirical evidence available does not rule a double dissociation 
out, thus not making the Causal Model an empirically unsound view (see also Carruthers, 2011). Anyhow, 
the mere fact that these two capacities are subserved by numerically distinct mechanisms does not by itself 
establish the peculiarity claim. The mechanisms need to be distinct in kind. 
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The Cartesian Intuition
It is sometimes believed that the peculiarity claim entails a principled asym-
metry, which the Causal Model cannot accommodate. So Gertler claims that “if 
introspective states are merely causally related to introspected thoughts, the disparity 
between self-knowledge and other-knowledge is not truly principled” (2000, p. 125). 
Gertler takes seriously what she calls the Cartesian intuition about self-ascription: 
that is, the intuition that we have privileged access in all possible worlds. 
It is easy to appreciate why the Causal Model does not seem to do justice to 
this intuition: it seems possible, according to this view, to have the same kind of 
access to someone else’s mind. In some possible world, a mechanism that, like MM, 
ascribes (non-inferentially and non-evidentially) mental states might be connected 
via “special rewiring” (Lycan, 1996, p. 49) to another person.26 So, given the Causal 
Model, the peculiarity of self-ascriptions won’t hold in every possible world. 
But how much of a problem is this? Well, it is not clear that most of us have 
any such intuition. Some philosophers (such as Tyler Burge, Stephen Wright and 
Sidney Shoemaker) might share this intuition (though notice that Gertler (2000, 
p. 126) thinks that the Cartesian intuition is limited to occurrent phenomena, not 
dispositional ones), but other philosophers and laypeople do not. Indeed, David 
Armstrong (Armstrong and Malcolm, 1984) thinks that rejecting this intuition is an 
asset since he takes “the claim that telepathic knowledge [is possible] to be the claim 
that we [can] have some direct awareness of the mental states of others” (Armstrong, 
1993, p. 124).27 Given that we can conceive this possibility, the asymmetry needn’t 
hold in all possible worlds. So there is no reason to require a principled disparity 
between self- and other-ascription, which means that the Causal Model can capture 
the peculiarity thesis by being a non-inferential, non-evidential causal process. 
This concludes my attempt to show that the Causal Model accounts for the 
peculiarity of self-ascription. Along the way, we pre-empted objections against the 
model but there is still one main objection that we have not faced. In the next sec-
tion, I introduce the objection and argue that it is unsuccessful. 
The Contingency of Self-Ascriptions
Some philosophers believe that introspective self-ascriptions cannot be 
contingently related to their subject matter. Such contingency is attacked more 
fervently by Sidney Shoemaker. Shoemaker argues that there is a necessary link 
between introspection and rationality, intelligence and conceptual capacities. 
So let’s consider his case. 
Shoemaker (1994b, 1994c [1988]) puts forward the argument from self-
blindness. This argument poses a direct threat to the Causal Model because it attacks 
views where the relation between beliefs and their self-ascriptions is contingent. 
The argument goes as follows: (1) if the connection between beliefs and their 
26 So this mechanism is fed the representations from the other’s belief box, embeds them in a schema of the 
form S/he believes that___ and such embedded representations are placed in one’s belief box. 
27 Interestingly, in some disorders of the self, “the subject feels that her own thought is shared by others, 
broadcast without her permission or withdrawn by others” (Bortolotti, 2010, p. 228). Consider also cases of 
thought ‘insertion’, where a subject is under the impression of having direct access to someone else’s thoughts 
(“the thoughts of Eamonn Andrews come into my mind. There are no other thoughts there, only his […]. 
He treats my mind like a screen and flashes thoughts onto it like you flash a picture”—Mellor, 1970, p. 17; 
“Thoughts come into my head like ‘Kill God’. It is just like my mind working, but it is not. They come from this 
chap, Chris. They’re his thoughts”—Frith, 1992, p. 66). 
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self-ascriptions is contingent, then self-blindness is a conceptual possibility, but (2) 
self-blindness is not a conceptual possibility, so (3) the connection between beliefs 
and their self-ascriptions is not contingent. Before we can judge (1) and (2), we 
need to introduce the pivotal notion of ‘self-blindness.’ A subject is self-blind when 
she lacks introspective awareness of her beliefs even while possessing normal intel-
ligence, rationality and conceptual capacities. So self-blindness does not entail any 
cognitive deficiency, just like the “person who lacks sight can in principle be equal 
in intelligence, rationality, and conceptual capacity to any sighted person” (1994b, 
p. 236). And although the subject cannot have self-knowledge through introspec-
tion, it can achieve such knowledge through self-interpretation: that is, through 
reasoning, in an inferential and evidential way (Shoemaker, 1994c, p. 30-31). 
Premise (1) seems uncontroversial. Given that beliefs and their self-ascriptions 
exist independently, it is possible for a belief never to be introspected. Indeed, it is 
possible that none of our beliefs be introspected. The contingency of self-ascriptions 
allows for the possibility of self-blindness. So given that the argument is valid, if 
we are to defend the contingency of self-ascriptions, our only alternative is to find 
premise (2) wanting. Shoemaker is aware of the fact that (2) is the key premise of 
his argument and so puts forward two main arguments to support it: the argument 
from Moore’s Paradox and the argument from the utility of introspection.28 Let’s 
take them in turn.
The argument from Moore’s Paradox (1994c, p. 34-37) is intended as a reduc-
tio of the possibility of self-blindness. Shoemaker’s strategy is to first consider what 
a self-blind person would be like and then argue that, given normal intelligence, 
rationality and conceptual capacities, such a person could not exist. Let me expand. 
Shoemaker claims that it is possible for the self-blind person to have evidence 
for p, while the “third-person” evidence available to him supports the proposition 
that he does not believe that p (1994c, p. 35). So, if this were to happen, the self-
blind person would be susceptible to uttering a Moorean sentence of the form ‘p, 
but I don’t believe that p’. But Shoemaker claims that, given that the self-blind 
person has normal intelligence, rationality and conceptual capacities (especially 
concerning the concept of belief), the self-blind person would be as capable as 
we are of recognising the paradoxical character of Moorean sentences and hence 
avoid them (1994c, p. 35). So, contrary to what we first thought, the self-blind 
person is not susceptible to making Moorean assertions. But now the self-blind 
person “is beginning to look just like a normal person. It would appear that there 
would be nothing in his behaviour, verbal or otherwise, that would give away the 
fact that he lacks [introspection]” (1994c, p. 36). And Shoemaker thinks that if one 
behaves as if one has introspective awareness of beliefs, then one does have such 
awareness (1994c, p. 34, 36). So, according to Shoemaker, the self-blind person 
has introspective awareness of his beliefs, contrary to what ex-hypothesi is meant 
to be the case, hence the reductio. This is meant to show then the impossibility of 
self-blindness: that is, the truth of (2). But is this argument successful? There are at 
least two reasons to believe that it is not. 
First, although the self-blind person begins to look just like a normal person, 
it is not clear their behaviour is equivalent. Given that the self-blind person’s self-
ascription is based on third-person evidence from which he reasons, if he was asked 
28 Given I am interested in the introspection of beliefs, I am ignoring other arguments Shoemaker puts forward 
for the impossibility of the lack of introspective awareness of different occurrent phenomena, such as pain and 
perceptual experiences (1994b, p. 226-231). I am ignoring them not because the arguments are not directly 
intended to apply to beliefs, but because they cannot be extended to apply to them given that the arguments 
rely on the different nature of the phenomena to which they are intended to apply. 
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how he arrived at such self-ascription or the grounds for such self-ascription, one 
would expect a different answer from the one a normal (non-self-blind) person 
would give.29 That is a potential behavioural mismatch, which mirrors the different 
processes involved in the self-ascription of the self-blind and the normal persons. 
Second, Shoemaker relies on the following principle: one’s behaviour provides 
the best possible evidence that one is introspectively aware of one’s beliefs (1994c, 
p. 34-36, 1994b, p. 236). The thing to note about it is that its best chance to be 
true is if applied broadly to awareness of one’s beliefs, rather than introspective 
awareness (which explains why Shoemaker sometimes seems to equivocate between 
the two notions when talking about this principle; see, e.g., 1994c, p. 34, 1994b, 
p. 236). Let me explain. 
Given normal intelligence, rationality and conceptual capacities, it is easy to 
see that a person who only possesses third-person evidence can work out what they 
believe and even avoid Moorean assertions. So a behavioural replica of a subject, 
with normal intelligence, rationality and conceptual capacities, seems to also have 
awareness of his mind. But this falls short of showing that such replica would also 
have introspective access to his mind. Unless one rules out the possibility that such 
self-awareness is achieved through self-interpretation, one cannot claim to have 
shown that such awareness is introspective. As Amy Kind (2003, p. 45) rightly says: 
At least in principle, [the fact that George, the allegedly self-blind person, is aware of 
his own beliefs to the same extent as a normal person would be] is consistent with 
the claim that George is self-blind, but has acquired the normal extent of awareness 
of his own beliefs […] via third-person access to these states. Self-blindness is defined 
in terms of [introspection], not [self-awareness]. 
Perhaps one only needs to show that such self-awareness is not entirely 
achieved through self-interpretation, so that one could claim that we have at least 
some introspective access to our minds. One might here attempt to apply Boghos-
sian’s insights about the limits of inferential and evidential accounts of self-awareness 
(§ 3). But, as noted, such accounts face problems when trying to account for one’s 
awareness of one’s mind when there seems to be no available evidence to infer its 
contents. But these are not the cases that Shoemaker has in mind when describing 
how George has, after all, awareness of his mind and so he starts to look just like 
a normal (non-self-blind) person. The cases Shoemaker focuses on are cases where 
there is evidence for George to infer that he believes so-and-so, and this is how 
Shoemaker can claim that George and the normal person are beginning to look 
like each other. 
So depending on whether George has the evidence or not, either Shoemaker 
cannot show that George does not lack introspective awareness (since his aware-
ness can be accounted for by means of self-interpretation) or he fails to show that 
George is like the normal person (since the evidence is what allows the similarity 
claim). Either way, Shoemaker’s reductio does not go through. The problem, in a 
nutshell, is that Shoemaker says nothing to rule out the possibility of the self-blind 
person’s self-awareness being achieved through self-interpretation (exclusively), 
and he cannot help himself to Boghossian’s insights about inferential and eviden-
tial accounts of self-ascription since his claim (required for the reductio) that the 
29 In fact, only in the case of the person with introspective access the question, say, “How do you know that 
you believe that Elvis was really blonde?” seems an unreasonable one. You just do (see, e.g., Neta, 2011, 
p. 18-19): there is no reason that supports your introspective self-ascription. This is what makes such self-
ascriptions groundlessly warranted. 
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self-blind and the normal persons are behaviourally alike is based on the fact that 
there is evidence for the self-blind person self-ascribing beliefs. So Shoemaker is not 
entitled to the claim that self-blindness is impossible on the basis of the argument 
from Moore’s Paradox. 
So, what about the argument from the utility of introspection? This argument 
(1994c, p. 27-30; 1994b, p. 237-240) is really based on a pair of considerations 
about the utility of self-knowledge, rather than introspection, and so it fails to show 
the impossibility of self-blindness for basically the same reasons the previous one 
does. Let me explain. 
Shoemaker points out that self-knowledge plays two useful roles in our lives: 
one in achieving our aims through cooperation and another in deliberation (1994c, 
p. 27-30). With respect to the first one, Shoemaker claims that a ‘rational agent’ (i.e., 
a person with normal intelligence, rationality and conceptual capacity) will realise the 
benefits of cooperation from others in order to achieve one’s aims and that getting 
this cooperation involves making clear what one believes, including saying ‘I believe 
that…’ (1994b, p. 238).30 So, again, the rational agent, who ex-hypothesi lacks intro-
spective access to his beliefs, will act as if he has such access. And, again, given the 
above principle (if someone acts as if she has introspective access, she has such access), 
Shoemaker can claim that, given intelligence, rationality and conceptual capacity, we 
do have introspective access to our beliefs. The problem, however, is that (regardless 
of the dubious nature of the principle), again, Shoemaker does not rule out the pos-
sibility of such self-knowledge being achieved through self-interpretation. Unless one 
can show that such self-knowledge cannot be achieved through self-interpretation, 
we do not have an argument against the possibility of self-blindness. 
Shoemaker might at this point reply that, from an evolutionary perspective, 
[It] would certainly be bizarre to suppose that, having endowed creatures with ev-
erything necessary to give them a certain very useful behavioural repertoire – namely 
that of creatures with normal intelligence, rationality, and conceptual capacity, plus 
the ability to acquire first order beliefs about the environment from sense-perception 
– Mother Nature went to the trouble of installing in them an additional mechanism, a 
faculty of Inner Sense [or the MM], whose impact on behaviour is completely redun-
dant, since its behavioural effects are ones that would occur anyhow as the result of 
the initial endowment (1994b, p. 239-240). 
However, as noted, it is not at all clear that the additional mechanism would 
not have an impact on behaviour. For example, the additional mechanism could make 
such self-ascriptions much faster and therefore bring evolutionary advantages to 
the creatures endowed with it. Furthermore, such mechanism would dispense with 
reasoning, thus allowing for parallel processing and leaving the reasoning capacity 
available for other important issues for which no mechanism can be selected (say, 
due to the unstable nature of the subject-matter). So the additional mechanism’s 
impact wouldn’t be redundant and, from an evolutionary perspective, there would 
be reasons for such mechanism to be selected.31 
With respect to the second useful role that self-knowledge plays in our lives, 
Shoemaker claims that it is essential to being rational that one engages in delibera-
30 Note that, for social non-human animals that engage in cooperation, this does not seem necessary; however, 
they are not thought to be ‘rational agents.’ 
31 Just as there seems to be reasons for thinking that two systems of reasoning have evolved, System 1 and 
System 2: S1 mostly operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort, and no sense of voluntary 
control, and often at a subpersonal level, whereas S2 is slow but deliberate, orderly and effortful (see, e.g., 
Evans, 2007; Evans and Over, 1996; Kahneman, 2011; Stanovich, 2004; see also Kornblith, 2012). 
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tion (1994c, p. 28-29; 1994b, p. 240). Now, regardless of whether we understand 
this claim in terms of reflective maintenance (i.e., the reviewing of beliefs) or in terms 
of what Tyler Burge (1996) calls critical reasoning (i.e., reasoning about reasons as 
reasons), the argument does not go through. Even if we agree that both sorts of 
reasoning require self-knowledge (but see Owens, 2011, p. 269; Cassam, 2014, 
p. 41-42, regarding the need of self-knowledge for reasoning), that falls short of 
showing that they require introspection. Again, unless the possibility of such knowl-
edge being achieved through self-interpretation is ruled out, Shoemaker does not 
have a case for a necessary link between rationality, intelligence and conceptual 
capacity, on the one hand, and introspection, on the other. For this, one would have 
to show that reasons cannot (always) be known through self-interpretation, and 
Shoemaker does not show that. 
But, anyway, even if one assumes that either reasoning requires introspection, 
this needn’t mean that lack of introspection is impossible. It can mean that self-
blindness has some higher-cognitive consequences, contrary to what Shoemaker 
claims. The parallel between (non-native) blindness and self-blindness might be 
misplaced (1994b, p. 236).32 In fact, one would expect introspection to have such 
higher-cognitive consequences, given that one is now taking rationality to presup-
pose introspection.33 
Moreover, although our introspective capacity might be required for higher 
types of reasoning, this does not entail that if one engages in such reasoning then 
our capacity for introspection comes for free with such abilities, intelligence and 
so on (as Shoemaker believes, 1994b, p. 243). It only entails that we do have such 
a capacity, and the Causal Model here suggested sustains that such capacity is 
subserved by MM. 
Also, and keeping in mind that not every kind of deliberation requires intro-
spection (Owens, 2011), notice that the above notion of rationality trivialises the 
claim that self-blindness is impossible. That is, if deliberation requires introspection 
and the requirement for rationality includes being a deliberator, and given that the 
self-blind person is ex-hypothesi rational, self-blindness is trivially (i.e., by definition) 
impossible. More importantly, there does not seem to be any reasons for accepting 
that the self-blind person is rational in this sense. 
So I conclude that both of Shoemaker’s arguments that attempt to establish 
the impossibility of self-blindness, premise (2), are unsuccessful. Consequently, Shoe-
maker’s argument from self-blindness isn’t cogent, given that there is no reason to 
hold the key premise (2) true, and so he fails to argue against the contingency of 
self-ascriptions. Shoemaker offers us no reason to reject the Causal Model on the 
basis that it posits a contingent connection between beliefs and their self-ascriptions. 
In fact, we have already seen (§ 5) that there is a strong prima facie case for such 
contingency given a realist commitment. 
Concluding remarks
Some might anyway complain at this point that, despite these and other 
advantages, this project was not worth pursuing from the outset, given that it does 
not aim to give an account of self-ascription of mental states in general (e.g., Cas-
sam, 2014; Goldman, 2006). That is, a single account that explains all self-ascription. 
32 A perceptual account of introspection might foster such a mistake. 
33 Just as one would expect higher-cognitive consequences if one had a damaged language (modular) faculty 
a la Chomsky (see, e.g., Smith, 1999). 
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Comprehensive, and so more parsimonious, accounts are normally desirable and 
often desired. But this degree of simplicity and elegance cannot be achieved when 
considering the general phenomenon of self-ascription. Although these theoretical 
virtues should and do influence our intellectual practices, in the case at hand they 
can only shape the investigation at the expense of inadequacy. 
Acknowledging the distinction between occurrent and dispositional mental 
phenomena represents only the beginning of a proper investigation. Already with 
this distinction in place, we can see that general accounts of self-ascription that 
exploit properties that are not shared by all mental phenomena will not succeed 
(such as Goldman’s Phenomenological account; see § 2, cf. Goldman 2006). To make 
matters worse, claims about privileged access vary depending on the different na-
tures of these phenomena. So, for example, self-ascriptions of sensations (such as 
pain) are often thought of as being more resilient to error (Gertler, 2008; see also 
Wright, 1998). This, however, does not mean that propositional attitudes could not 
be as secure as sensations are. If Burge (1996) is correct, cogito-like thoughts are 
self-verifying and so infallible. But it is likely that propositional attitudes that are 
dispositional, such as beliefs, do not enjoy this greater security. 
So it seems that not even a general account of self-ascription for the proposi-
tional attitudes is to be expected (as some appreciate; e.g., Moran, 2001). The diverse 
natures of the different propositional attitudes seem to prevent such an account. 
Indeed, even within a more constrained folk-psychological category we might find 
fundamental differences. For instance, if we distinguish between higher-cognitive 
emotions, such as romantic love and jealousy, and basic emotions, such as fear and 
anger (see, e.g., Griffiths, 1997), we can appreciate that the account of self-ascrip-
tion of one set of phenomena and of the other might easily differ. Self-ascription 
of higher-cognitive emotions is likely to be only the product of self-interpretation 
(say, due to their more recent history in the species and the frequent self-deception 
that accompanies them), whereas self-ascription of basic emotions might be also 
the product of introspection (say, due to the clear evolutionary advantage that this 
would provide and universality). Indeed, a mechanism very much like MM could 
perhaps subserve such introspective capacity. Perhaps even dispositional states other 
than beliefs could be subserved by (distinct) MM mechanisms (see Nichols and Stich, 
2003). But it definitely remains to be seen whether the Causal Model can plausibly 
be extended to other mental states. 
However, the point stands: beliefs, sensations and passing thoughts (to men-
tion some) are all very different mental phenomena and there is no reason to think 
that a general account of self-ascription can be achieved. It is extremely likely that 
a plurality of processes are required to explain our capacity for self-ascribing (as 
some appreciate; e.g., Schwitzgebel, 2012), provided one does not overlook the 
differences between distinct types of mental states or does not focus on a limited 
range of phenomena. And one such process is the non-inferential, non-evidential, 
causal process subserved by MM for the introspection of beliefs. 
So to conclude, I have developed and defended an account of the introspection 
of beliefs: the Causal Model. We have seen that the main thesis of the model is that 
the tracking of a belief is causal and contingent. I have, to this end, put forward a 
specific mechanism to flesh out the proposal: MM. This mechanism subserves the 
introspective process. This process is different in kind from the process of ascribing 
beliefs to others. 
Moreover, I have tackled along the way a series of criticisms. We have, for 
example, seen that the usual problems that Inner Sense accounts of introspec-
tion face do not affect this account. But perhaps more importantly, given that 
the Causal Model is committed to a contingent relation between beliefs and their 
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self-ascriptions, we have seen that attacks on such a connection are not successful. 
Indeed, we have seen that there is a prima facie case for this contingency, which 
in turn points to more assets of this account, such as rendering self-ascription a 
genuine cognitive achievement and straightforwardly making sense of a variety 
of phenomena, including self-error and self-ignorance. In fact, the Causal Model 
captures all of the constraints set by our starting point: realism about the mental. 
All this shows that the Causal Model is, from a realist (and naturalist) perspective, 
an excellent candidate for explaining our peculiar introspective access to beliefs.
The Causal Model, supplemented by the MM hypothesis, is then the expla-
nation I propose for how we access in a special way our own beliefs. The Causal 
Model does have its more than fair share of critics and indeed the model has, in 
recent years, fallen out of favour in the philosophical world. However, I hope this 
paper has shown that it should not have. 
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